#30 sigo sin ver claro qué es lo que consideras "ser occidental", ¿parecerse a Finlandia es ser occidental? ¿o parecerse a UK o a USA? ¿ser occidental es tener internet caro, hipotecas caras, políticos ladrones y corporaciones que fuerzan a que consumas solo lo que ellos venden? ¿ser occidental es poder quejarte del gobierno en el bar, (porque en otro sitio no te van a hacer ni puto caso)? O es simplemente ser parte cautiva en lo económico y militar de un bloque geopolítico que hace lo que sale de los huevos sin contar nunca con los de a pie, que somos nosotros? Porque si es esto último, todo el puto planeta es occidental
#31 Ser occidental es poder quejarte en el Bar y que no te metan un chute de novichok
Ser occidental es poder presentarte a unas elecciones como candidato y que no te envenene Putin.
Ser occidental es asumir que Portugal se independizó hace siglos y que no es tu espacio vital y que no puedes bombardearlo.
Occidente no es idílico, pero es mejor que la Rusia de Putin.
Y no, el tema oriente occidente no es un tema de dinero o de sistema económico, es algo mucho más complicado que nunca serás capaz de comprender, sobre todo, si no has estado habitualmente en este de Europa.
#32 todo es un tema de dinero, aunque a nosotros se nos venda que tenemos "elección" pero sin darnos cuenta que lo que podemos elegir es irrelevante de cara nuestro futuro
#33 Hombre, tienes más posibilidades de tener una mejor calidad de vida si eliges el modelo estonio de sociedad que si te imponen el modelo Bielorruso de sociedad, el modelo Bielorruso, es lo que quiere Rusia para Ucrania.
#34 La calidad de vida se obtiene económicamente (y no olvidemos que hasta el final de la Guerra Fría ese bienestar europeo estaba motivado por diferenciar y contentar al obrero europeo y que no cayese en la tentación del comunismo), y hay países más jodidos que otros por diversas circunstancias, pero una de las más importantes es porque carecen de recursos que les hagan ser competitivos en la economía mundial, Bielorrusia es uno de esos países, Ucrania es otro. Muchas veces su valor es más estratégico que real, y este es uno de los casos.
#35 No dices más que bobadas, ahora resulta que la calidad de vida en Europa se basaba en el miedo al comunismo.
De verdad por favor qué cansaditos sois los nostálgicos del muro de Berlín, a ver si lo superáis ya.
Vosotros pensáis que el obrero europeo era gilipollas y no sabía perfectamente que el comunismo, para el obrero, era una montaña de mierda del tamaño de Siberia.
Análisis nivel Iñigo Errejón.
Hace un tiempo encontré un cartel antiguo de los años 30 en el que se estimulaba al empresario a tratar bien a sus trabajadores para evitar que se viesen atraídos por el radicalismo y comunismo, en un puto anuncio de toallitas, hay más por ahí rodando así que puedes ignorar eso si te apetece, como los que ignoran la historia
In 2017, historian Walter Scheidel argued that the establishment of welfare states in the West in the early 20th century could be partly a reaction by elites to the Bolshevik Revolution and its violence against the bourgeoisie, which feared violent revolution in its own backyard. They were diminished decades later as the perceived threat receded. Scheidel wrote:
It's a little tricky because the US never really had any strong leftist movement. But if you look at Europe, after 1917 people were really scared about communism in all the Western European countries. You have all these poor people, they might rise up and kill us and take our stuff. That wasn't just a fantasy because it was happening next door. And that, we can show, did trigger steps in the direction of having more welfare programs and a rudimentary safety net in response to fear of communism. Not that they [the communists] would invade, but that there would be homegrown movements of this sort. American populism is a little different because it's more detached from that. But it happens roughly at the same time, and people in America are worried about communism, too – not necessarily very reasonably. But that was always in the background. And people have only begun to study systematically to what extent the threat, real or imagined, of this type of radical regime really influenced policy changes in Western democracies. You don't necessarily even have to go out and kill rich people – if there was some plausible alternative out there, it would arguably have an impact on policy making at home. That's certainly there in the 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, and 60s. And there's a debate, right, because it becomes clear that the Soviet Union is really not in very good shape, and people don't really like to be there, and all these movements lost their appeal. That's a contributing factor, arguably, that the end of the Cold War coincides roughly with the time when inequality really starts going up again, because elites are much more relaxed about the possibility of credible alternatives or threats being out there.[129]
1k 40
Hemos deshabilitado la autenticación con Facebook. Si entras a Mediatize con una cuenta de Facebook, lee esto.
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Ser occidental es poder presentarte a unas elecciones como candidato y que no te envenene Putin.
Ser occidental es asumir que Portugal se independizó hace siglos y que no es tu espacio vital y que no puedes bombardearlo.
Occidente no es idílico, pero es mejor que la Rusia de Putin.
Y no, el tema oriente occidente no es un tema de dinero o de sistema económico, es algo mucho más complicado que nunca serás capaz de comprender, sobre todo, si no has estado habitualmente en este de Europa.
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De verdad por favor qué cansaditos sois los nostálgicos del muro de Berlín, a ver si lo superáis ya.
Vosotros pensáis que el obrero europeo era gilipollas y no sabía perfectamente que el comunismo, para el obrero, era una montaña de mierda del tamaño de Siberia.
Análisis nivel Iñigo Errejón.
Hace un tiempo encontré un cartel antiguo de los años 30 en el que se estimulaba al empresario a tratar bien a sus trabajadores para evitar que se viesen atraídos por el radicalismo y comunismo, en un puto anuncio de toallitas, hay más por ahí rodando así que puedes ignorar eso si te apetece, como los que ignoran la historia
www.bbvaopenmind.com/articulos/el-estado-de-bienestar-y-las-politicas-
www.ub.edu/ciudadania/hipertexto/bienestar/introduccion/2.htm
posmodernia.com/el-estado-del-bienestar-como-respuesta-al-bloque-sovie
In 2017, historian Walter Scheidel argued that the establishment of welfare states in the West in the early 20th century could be partly a reaction by elites to the Bolshevik Revolution and its violence against the bourgeoisie, which feared violent revolution in its own backyard. They were diminished decades later as the perceived threat receded. Scheidel wrote:
It's a little tricky because the US never really had any strong leftist movement. But if you look at Europe, after 1917 people were really scared about communism in all the Western European countries. You have all these poor people, they might rise up and kill us and take our stuff. That wasn't just a fantasy because it was happening next door. And that, we can show, did trigger steps in the direction of having more welfare programs and a rudimentary safety net in response to fear of communism. Not that they [the communists] would invade, but that there would be homegrown movements of this sort. American populism is a little different because it's more detached from that. But it happens roughly at the same time, and people in America are worried about communism, too – not necessarily very reasonably. But that was always in the background. And people have only begun to study systematically to what extent the threat, real or imagined, of this type of radical regime really influenced policy changes in Western democracies. You don't necessarily even have to go out and kill rich people – if there was some plausible alternative out there, it would arguably have an impact on policy making at home. That's certainly there in the 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, and 60s. And there's a debate, right, because it becomes clear that the Soviet Union is really not in very good shape, and people don't really like to be there, and all these movements lost their appeal. That's a contributing factor, arguably, that the end of the Cold War coincides roughly with the time when inequality really starts going up again, because elites are much more relaxed about the possibility of credible alternatives or threats being out there.[129]